If instead it reacted it meant that precedents had failed me and I was wrong; and the only thing to do when a man is wrong is to be right by ceasing to be wrong.
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Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 77)
But you find many people, reputed to be intelligent, who are bullish because they have stocks.
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 71)
But the average man doesn’t wish to be told that it is a bull or a bear market. What he desires is to be told specifically which particular stock to buy or sell. He wants to get something for nothing. He does not wish to work. He doesn’t even wish to have to think. It is too much bother to have to count the money that he picks up from the ground.
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 57)
One of the most helpful things that anybody can learn is to give up trying to catch the last eight–or the first. These two are the most expensive eighths in the world.
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 57)
Men who can both be right and sit tight are uncommon.
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 51)
Some men, like old Russell Sage, have the money-making and the money-hoarding instinct equally well developed, and of course they die disgustingly rich.
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 14)
There is the plain fool, who does the wrong thing at all times everywhere, but there is the Wall Street fool, who thinks he must trade all the time. No man can always have adequate reasons for buying or selling stocks daily–or sufficient knowledge to make his plan an intelligent play.
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator by Edwin Lefèvre (pg. 11)
I knew something was wrong somewhere, but I couldn’t spot it exactly. But if something was coming and I didn’t know where from, I couldn’t be on my guard against it. That being the case I’d better be out of the market.
Devil Take The Hindmost by Edward Chancellor (pg. 324)
By this date the post-bubble revulsion against stocks was so complete that over 60 percent of Japanese personal assets were committed to cash bearing interest of less than 0.5 percent per annum.
Devil Take The Hindmost by Edward Chancellor (pg. 303)
The day after the October crash, representatives of Japan’s largest brokerages–Nomura, Daiwa, Yamaichi, and Nikko Securities, collectively known as the “Big Four”–were summoned to the Ministry of Finance. They were ordered to make a market in NTT shares and keep the Nikkei above the 21,000 level. Complying with this request, the brokers offered their most important clients guarantees against losses in order to encourage them to reenter the market. Within a few months, the Nikkei had recovered its losses and was progressing to new heights. In private, Ministry of Finance officials boasted that manipulating the stock market was simpler than controlling the foreign exchanges.